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COMMENTS 
FEDERAL TAXATION-TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE BUY AND 
SELL AGREEMENTS-One of the major problems faced by a closely-
held corporation is that of providing for the orderly continuation 
of the corporation on the death of one of its shareholders. A 
common solution to the problem is the utilization of a buy and sell 
agreement in the form of either a stock purchase or cross purchase 
agreement. A stock purchase agreement, often called a stock re-
demption agreement, provides that the corporation will buy the 
deceased shareholder's stock upon his death.1 A cross purchase 
agreement provides that a surviving shareholder,2 as distinguished 
from the corporation, will buy the decedent's interest on his 
death. The funds for either type of purchase agreement can come 
from cash accumulated by the survivor or the corporation, but 
the most common source is the proceeds of a life insurance policy.3 
Since the method of financing is fairly unimportant to this dis-
cussion,4 it will be assumed that the agreements are funded by 
insurance. If a different result would follow in a particular in-
stance by financing through the accumulation of cash, specific 
reference will be made to that difference. 
It is the purpose of this comment to consider the tax problems 
connected with both types of "conventional" corporate buy and 
sell agreements.5 It should be recognized, however, that there are 
1 Agreements of this sort have also been referred to as stock redemption agreements 
or survivor purchase agreements, but will be referred to herein solely as stock purchase 
agreements. Deceased shareholder will be used to xefer to the party to the agreement who 
dies first. 
2 Surviving shareholder or survivor will be used herein to refer to the shareholder 
to the agreement who survives. 
a If a cross purchase agreement is used, each shareholder will purchase insurance 
on the life of the other shareholders and will name himself as beneficiary. Other methods, 
such as the purchase of insurance on one's own life with oneself as beneficiary and a 
provision in the agreement for the share to transfer automatically to the survivor, can 
be used but are dangerous. See part I-B-4 infra. If a stock purchase agreement is used, 
only one policy need be purchased by the corporation on the life of each shareholder 
and the corporation will name itself as beneficiary. 
4 Most of the problems discussed will apply to ·both methods of financing. 
5 "Conventional" is used here to mean a properly executed agreement with all of 
the necessary provisions. This agreement will be compared with the improperly drafted 
agreements that are presented by the cases. See Jones and Gleason, "Casale Reversed: 
Corporate Insurance Not Dividend to Controlling Stockholder," 7 J. TAXATION 258 at 262 
(1957); Mannheimer and Friedman, "Stock-Retirement Agreements-The Prunier and 
Sanders Cases," 35 TAXES 567 (1957). Many_ of the problems of corporate -buy and sell 
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many questions of local law and business necessity that also exert 
influence on the use of such agreements.6 
I. STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENTS 
A. Operation of the Agreement Before the Death of One of the 
Parties 
I. Income Tax Liability of the Shareholders for Premium 
Payments. When insurance is used to finance a stock purchase 
agreement, there is a possibility that the payment of premiums 
by the corporation will be considered a constructive dividend 
to the shareholders.7 Yet three recent cases, Casale v. Commis-
sioner,8 Sanders v. Fox,9 and Prunier v. Commissioner,1° have 
considerably lessened this possibility. These cases make it fairly 
clear that the insurance premium will not be considered a dividend 
to the shareholders11 if the corporation retains any property inter-
est in the policy, 12 whether it is legal or equitable in nature. The 
agreements apply equally to partnership buy and sell agreements. Generally see Samuels, 
"Funding Partnership Buy-and-Sell Agreements with Life Insurance," 35 TAXES 857 (1957); 
comment, 71 HARV. L. REv. 687 at 697 (1958); Willis and Fortser, "Partnership Buy-and-
Sell Agreements," 96 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 337 (1957). 
6 Local law problems include restrictions on redemptions from surplus, validity of 
restrictions on the alienation of stock, illusory agreements, testamentary intent, insurable 
interest and validity of option agreements. See O'Neal, "Restrictions on Transfer of 
Stock in Closely Held Corporations: Planning and Drafting," 65 HARV. L. REv. 773 (1952); 
comment, 71 HARv. L. REv. 687 at 711 (1958). The shareholders should analyze the facts 
of their individual situation to see if a buy and sell agreement is the best means of con-
tinuing the corporation on death. Option agreements, inter vivos gifts or inter vivos 
sale may be proper alternatives in some situations. 
7 Constructive dividends are dividends that were not actually received, but since the 
shareholder benefits from the distribution it is treated as if he actually received the 
payment. See Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 
602. 
8 (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 440, revg. 26 T.C. 1020 (1956). 
9 (10th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 855, revg. (D.C. Utah 1957) 149 F. Supp. 942. 
10 (1st Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 818, revg. 28 T.C. 19 (1957). 
11 Several earlier cases involving insurance, though not a stock purchase agreement, 
used this principle. George Matthew Adams, 18 B.T.A. 381 (1929); N. Loring Danforth, 
18 B.T .A. 1221 (1930); Lawthers, "Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Buyout Plan," 
7 J. TAXATION 2 (1957). However, some cases involving insurance have held the premiums 
taxable to the corporation even where the corporation has retained a property interest. 
Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1946) 153 F. (2d) 602. There may 
be a distinction between standard insurance and insurance for a stock purchase agree-
ment when the beneficiary is the shareholder because a stock purchase agreement ties 
the insurance closer to the corporation. 
12 The reason for this is that the stock purchase agreement may never reach fruition 
and the shareholder would have been taxed for nothing. MacNeill, "Disposition of Business 
Interests," 87 TRUSTS AND EsrATES 398 at 403 (1918); Mannheimer and Friedman, "Stock-
Retirement Agreements-The Prunier and Sanders Cases," 35 TAXES 567 (1957). 
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decisions are based on the distinction drawn between a shareholder 
and his corporation.13 Using the corporate entity theory, these 
cases rejected the argument that the premiums are constructive 
dividends merely because the shareholders benefit from the in-
surance policies.14 
It appears that the shareholders can own the policies, select 
the beneficiaries and still avoid dividend treatment if they give 
the corporation some slight property interest. There is a warning 
in each of these cases, however, of possible constructive dividend 
treatment if the corporation's property interest becomes non-
existent. For maximum safety and to avoid possible litigation, 
the best procedure would be to designate the corporation as owner 
and beneficiary of the insurance policies used to finance a stock 
purchase agreement. 
2. Income Tax Deduction to the Corporation for Premium 
Payments. When life insurance is used by the corporation to 
finance a stock purchase agreement, the premiums are clearly not 
deductible as compensation to employees when the corporation 
is either directly or indirectly a beneficiary of the policy.15 Since 
the corporation should retain some interest in the insurance if 
the stockholder is to avoid constructive dividend treatment, the 
corporation would be either a direct or indirect beneficiary, and 
lose any possible deduction. 
3. Improper Accumulations of Surplus. Accumulations of 
surplus to fund a stock purchase agreement, represented by liquid 
assets or the cash surrender value of an insurance policy, niay sub-
ject the corporation to the accumulated earnings tax imposed by 
sections 531-537.16 The tax will be imposed only when there is 
an accumulation "for the purpose of avoiding the income tax 
with respect to its shareholders."17 But the intent to avoid income 
taxes will be presumed when there is an accumulation "beyond 
13 I.R.C., §§1, 11. 
14 The shareholder clearly benefits under these agreements from such things as an 
assured market for his stock, a definite fund with which to redeem the stock, and an 
assured minimum price. Lawthers, "Prunier Offers No Threat to a Sound Insured Buyout 
Plan," 7 J. TAXATION 2 at 5 (1957); Sanders v. Fox, (D.C. Utah 1957) 149 F. Supp. 942. 
15 I.R.C., §264(a)(I); Merrimac Hat Corp., 29 B.T .A. 690 (1934). 
16 I.R.C., §§531-537. For a general explanation of this tax, see Cary, "Accumulations 
Beyond the Reasonable Needs of the Business: The Dilemma of Section 102(c)," 60 HARv. 
L. REV. 1282 (1949); Barker, "Penalty Tax on Corporations Improperly Accumulating 
Surplus," 35 TAXES 949 (1957). 
17 I.R.C., §532(a). 
1959] COMMENTS 581 
the reasonable needs of the business,"18 unless the corporation can 
prove a contrary intent "by the preponderance of the evidence.''19 
Since proving a contrary intent is extremely difficult, this presump-
tion is highly significant.20 
It is generally felt that the penalty tax should not be applied 
to funds used to finance a stock purchase agreement because such 
accumulations are clearly for a business purpose and are not for 
the purpose of avoiding the income tax on shareholders. The 
recently decided case of Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commis-
sioner,21 however, casts some doubt upon this conclusion.22 In the 
Pelton case owners of 80 percent of the corporate stock devised a 
plan whereby the corporation would, following a recapitalization, 
purchase their entire common stock and half of their preferred 
stock interests for roughly $800,000; in this manner the minority 
common stockholder would be permitted to obtain complete 
control of the corporation. To finance the plan the corporation 
borrowed $500,000 and retained earnings during the taxable year 
of $209,731. It was on this accumulation that the penalty tax was 
imposed. The Tax Court, which was -affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reasoned that "where a closely 
held corporation adopts some plan ( even having as its purpose 
the satisfaction of an otherwise bona fide business need)" by 
which its stockholders save substantial income taxes,23 and "but 
for this tax saving, the same result could have been accom-
1s I.R.C., §533(a). Reasonably anticipated needs is included in the term reasonable 
needs of the business. I.R.C., §537. 
19 For a case where there was an unreasonable accumulation but where there was 
no intent to avoid the tax, see Gus Blass Co., 9 T.C. 15 at 37 (1947). Further discussion 
of burden of proof can be found in Kopperud and Donaldson, "The Burden of Proof 
in Accumulated Surplus Cases," 35 TAXES 827 (1957). 
20 If an unreasonable accumulation cannot be established, usually most courts will 
be reluctant to find an intent to avoid the income tax on the shareholders. But see 
Whitney Chain &: Mfg. Co., 3 T.C. 1109 (1944), affd. per curiam (2d Cir. 1945) 149 F. 
(2d) 936. 
21 28 T.C. 153 (1957), affd. (7th Cir. 1958) 251 F. (2d) 278. 
22 There is no danger if the accumulated earnings and profits are below $100,000 
because §535(c) was amended to provide that no accumulated earnings ta.x will be applied 
to the first $100,000 accumulated. It is doubtful if the accumulated earnings tax would 
apply to a corporation where substantial dividends were declared each year or where 
the shareholders were in a low income tax bracket because an intent to avoid taxation on 
the shareholders could not be established. Mannheimer, "Insurance to Fund Stock-
Retirement and Buy-and-Sell Agreements," 9 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX. 77 at 96 (1951). 
The tax would clearly not apply to a publicly owned corporation because the intent to 
avoid the tax on a large number of shareholders could not be shown. 
23 The approximate amount of savings was $70,000. See Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. 
Commissioner, 28 T.C. 153 at 172 (1957). 
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plished with the declaration and payment of a dividend," 
it is probable that there is an intent to avoid taxes within the 
meaning of section 531.24 
While this broad language appears applicable to stock pur-
chase agreements of the type here under consideration, it can be 
argued that this reasoning will not extend to such agreements 
since they are essentially different from the transaction involved 
in the Pelton case. The Pelton case involved in substance an 
immediate transfer from the majority to the minority shareholder 
in a form dictated by tax avoidance. The majority shareholders 
set the price at which the corporation would redeem their shares. 
On the other hand a stock purchase agreement is a freely nego-
tiated agreement to provide for the orderly redemption at some 
future time of a shareholder's interest at a price which reflects 
the true value of the corporation. 
There is a further distinction in that, while the agreement 
in the Pelton case had the effect of injuring the corporation by 
reducing its immediate working capital by 60 percent and im-
posing a new $500,000 obligation, a stock purchase agreement 
does in fact benefit the corporation. The benefits from such an 
agreement would include continuity of management, encourage-
ment of creditors, improvement of employee morale, and avoid-
ance of inexperienced ownership.25 When life insurance is used 
to finance the stock purchase agreement, the corp9ration often 
derives the added benefit of financial protection against the loss 
received by the death of key employees.26 If these distinctions 
are accepted, the reasoning of the Pelton case should not be 
extended to stock purchase agreements. That the Tax Court did 
not intend the language in its decision of that case to extend 
24 Id. at 174. See Sorden, "CA-7 Opinion in Pelton Steel Clouds Rules on Surplus 
Accumulation, Redemption," 8 J. TAXATION 254 (1958). 
25 Prunier v. Commissioner, (1st Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 818; Emeloid Co. v. Com-
missioner, (3d Cir. 1951) 189 F. (2d) 230; Edgar M. Docherly, 47 B.T.A. 462 (1942); Fred 
F. Fisher, 6 CCH T.C.M. 520 (1947). Mannheimer and Friedman, "Stock-Retirement 
Agreements," 28 TAXES 423 (1950); Kimbrough, "Buy-Sell Agreements," 97 TRUSTS AND 
ESTATES 925 (1958). 
20 This is only of minor significance if it is remembered that the proceeds will be 
paid out on death for the decedent's stock and will not be used by the corporation. For 
cases involving key man insurance, see General Smelting Co., 4 T.C. 313 (1944); Bradford• 
Robinson Printing Co. v. United States, 58-1 U.S.T.C. U9262 (1957). Some argue that the 
tax should not be imposed when insurance is involved. Sneed, "A Defense of the Tax 
Court's Result in Prunier and Sanders," 43 CORN. L.Q. 339 at 373 (1958); Larkin, "Survivor 
Purchase Agreements and Taxes," 97 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 881 (1958). 
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beyond the factual situation presented is illustrated by the fact that 
two similar cases were stated by the court to be inapplicable on 
the ground that a clear business purpose had existed in both.27 
There is also a recent case,28 involving a 5-0 percent redemption, 
in which the court did not apply the Pelton test. Instead of looking 
only to see if the transaction could have been accomplished by a 
dividend and disregarding any business purpose, the court scru-
tinized the redemption to determine whether it was for a reason-
able business purpose. 
If it is accepted that a stock purchase agreement has a reason-
able business purpose, which seems fairly clear, an accumulation 
of earnings and profits to effectuate the agreement would not be 
presumed to be for the purpose of avoiding income tax on share-
holders. In seeking to invoke the penalty tax, however, the 
government could still rely on the argument made in the Pelton 
case that an intent to avoid the income tax is present if the "same 
result could have been accomplished ... with the declaration and 
payment of a dividend." In the Pelton case, as indicated, the court 
was of the opinion that the redemption of the 80 percent interest 
could have as easily been effectuated through a dividend payment 
as through the accumulation of earnings, since dividend payments 
would reduce the value of the shareholders' interests in the 
corporation and correspondingly less cash would be needed to 
redeem their stock at the designated time. Yet it would seem 
doubtful that the "same result" could be accomplished when a 
50 percent stock interest is to be redeemed. The difference might 
best be illustrated by an example. Assume a corporation worth 
$400,000, with $350,000 earnings and profits. The value of an 
80 percent interest in this corporation is $320,000. A straight 
cash redemption would cost the corporation $320,000, and leave 
it with $30,000 earnings and profits. If the corporation paid a 
dividend of $100,000, the value of the 80 percent interest would 
27 Dill Mfg. Co., 39 B.T.A. 1023 (1939); Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, (D.C. Ark. 
1952) 103 F. Supp. 779. 
28 Penn. Needle Co., 17 CCH T.C.M. 504 (1958). Other cases where a reasonable 
business purpose was successfully argued: Hedberg-Freidheim Contracting Co., 15 CCH 
T.C.M. 1433 (1956); Fred F. Fisher, 6 CCH T.C.M. 520 (1947); W. H. Gunlocke Chair 
Co., 2 CCH T.C.M. 885 (1943). Cases where a reasonable business purpose was argued 
but the court held against the taxpayer: Helvering v. Chicago Stock Yards Co., 318 U.S. 
693 (1943); Trico Products Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 B.T.A. 346 (1942), affd. (2d Cir 
1943) 137 F, (2d) 424. For a review of other cases in this area, see Altman, "Corporate 
Accumulation of Earnings," 36 TAXES 933 (1958). 
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be reduced to $240,000, but the shareholder would have received 
$80,000 in dividends. A redemption for $240,000 would then 
leave the corporation with $10,000 earnings and profits. Thus 
the difference to the corporation under the alternative plans is 
only $20,000 in earnings and profits. In the case of a 50 percent 
redemption, the corporation without paying a dividend would 
have to spend $200,000 to redeem the interest, and would be left 
with $150,000 earnings and profits. If a dividend of $100,000 were 
paid, the corporation could subsequently redeem the 50 percent 
interest for $150,000. This would leave $100,000 in earnings and 
profits. Here the corporation's earnings and profits have been 
reduced to the extent of $50,000 in excess of what would have 
been needed for a straight cash redemption. The government, 
therefore, might find it quite difficult when a 50 percent redemp-
tion is involved, to argue that the "same result" could have been 
accomplished by the payment of a dividend. Since the courts 
were not disturbed by the 80-20 ownership ratio in the Pelton 
case, however, future cases in this area must be closely observed. 
B. Operation of the Agreement on the Death 
of One of the Parties 
I. Redemption Proceeds as Dividends to the Estate. On the 
death of one of the parties to a stock purchase agreement, the 
decedent's estate surrenders its shares to the corporation for a 
predetermined price. The treatment of this transaction is governed 
by the redemption provision in section 302.29 The question raised 
by this section is whether the redemption will be treated as a 
sale or exchange of stock, or as a dividend. If it is treated as a sale 
or exchange, the gain is measured by the difference between the 
fair market value at the decedent's death (the basis of the stock 
in the hands of the estate) and the amount realized from the 
redemption.80 Normally, however, if the sale or exchange is pur-
suant to a conventional stock purchase agreement, there will be 
no difference between the amount realized from the redemption 
29 I.R.C., §302. See generally Rasman, "Stock Redemptions," 35 TAXES 355 (1957); 
Roeder, "Distributions in Redemption of Stock," 15 N.Y.U. INsr. ON FED. TAX. 475 (1957); 
Waldo, "Liquidating a Shareholder's Interest in a Closely Held Corporation," 28 TAXES 
1162 (1950). I.R.C., §691 clearly does not apply. See comment, 1958 UNiv. !LI.. L. FoRUM 
135 at 150. 
so I.R.C., §lO0l(a). 
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and the fair market value.31 Furthermore, if there were any gain 
it would be taxed at capital gains rates. If the redemption is treated 
as a dividend, the entire amount paid by the corporation for the 
stock would be taxed at ordinary rates without regard to basis.82 
When the stock of the corporation is owned by unrelated 
parties, the redemption will most likely be treated as a sale or ex-
change. Section 302(b) provides that a redemption shall be treated 
as a sale or exchange when the redemption is (1) "not essentially 
equivalent to a dividend,"33 (2) "substantially disproportionate 
with respect to the shareholder" whose stock is redeemed, 34 or 
(3) a "termination of the shareholder's interest."35 The last two are 
objective standards which, if met, would guarantee sale or ex-
change treatment. In the ordinary stock purchase agreement the 
deceased's interest in the corporation is completely terminated. 
Thus the redemption would be treated as a sale or exchange under 
section 302(b)(3) and the estate would not be liable for a heavy 
tax on a dividend. Even if the estate's interest were not completely 
terminated, it could qualify for sale or exchange treatment by 
meeting the specified conditions under the "substantially dis-
proportionate" corridor of section 302(b)(2). These conditions 
are that after the redemption the shareholder must have less than 
50 percent of the corporate voting power, and his proportionate 
interest must be less than 80 percent of his proportionate interest 
before redemption. 
If the decedent's estate fails to meet either of the guaranteed 
standards which permit sale or exchange treatment, the estate may 
attempt to show that the redemption is "not essentially equivalent 
to a dividend." This would be difficult to show because it is doubt-
ful whether a court would hold that a shareholder who cannot 
meet ·the two new objective standards established by Congress 
81 I.R.C., §1014(a) provides that the estate's basis for the stock is the fair market 
value at death, and Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(d) (1944) provides that a valid stock redemp-
tion agreement will determine the fair market value of the stock if certain conditions 
are met. See part I-B-5 infra. 
82 If a redemption does not meet one of the tests in I.R.C., §302(b) then the "amount 
distributed" as determined in §301 would be includible in income as a dividend to the 
extent of the corporation's earnings and profits, as set out in §316(a). This assumes that 
there is no question of partial liquidation (I.R.C., §346) or of "tainted" preferred stock 
(I,R.C., §306). 
33 I.R.C., §302(b)(l). 
34 I.R.C., §302(b)(2). 
811 I.R.C., §302(b)(3). 
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can still qualify under the old subjective test.36 Actually this 
question is of little concern where the stock is owned by unrelated 
parties as most redemptions in such situations would qualify for 
sale or exchange treatment under one of the two objective stand-
ards of section 302. 
When the corporation is owned by related parties, however, 
the constructive ownership rule presents a real danger.37 In this 
situation the question is whether or not, on the death of one of the 
parties, the stock of one of the related survivors will be attributed 
to the decedent's estate and thereby cause the estate to lose the 
benefit of sale or exchange treatment. The constructive ownership 
rules provide that certain taxpayers are to be treated as if they 
owned the stock held by related taxpayers. Under section 318 an in-
dividual is treated as owning the stock of "his spouse, ... children, 
grandchildren, and parents."38 An estate is considered to own 
stock held by each beneficiary and the beneficiary is considered 
to own a proportionate part of the stock owned by the estate.39 
Since "stock constructively owned by a person . . . shall . . . be 
treated as actually owned by such person,"40 there can be a series 
of stock attribution links so that the beneficiary of an estate may 
not directly own any stock, but may through a parent, grandchild, 
child, or spouse constructively own some stock which will then 
in turn be attributed to the estate.41 This gives the constructive 
ownership rules tremendous breadth which multiplies the risks 
in this area.42 There is one exception to the series of attribution 
links-no one chain can include more than one link due to family 
relationship.43 Thus stock owned by a son can be attributed to 
his father but not through the father_ to the son's brother.44 Apply-
36 The only test for sale or exchange treatment before 1954 was "essentially equivalent 
to a dividend." 
37 I.R.C., §318. See generally Winton and Hoffman, "A Case Study of Stock Redemp• 
tions under Sections 302 and 318 of the New Code," IO TAX L. REv. 363 (1955); Larkin, 
"Stock Redemption: Sections 302 and 318," 14 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 671 (1956); 
Hoffman, "1954 Code Can Turn Buy-Sell Agreements into Disastrous Tax Traps for 
Stockholders," 4 J. TAXATION 322 (1956). 
38 I.R.C., §318(a)(l). 
39 There are similar rules applicable for trusts and their beneficiaries, partnerships 
and partners, corporations and controlling shareholders. I.R.C., §318(a)(2). 
40 I.R.C., §318(a)(4)(A). 
41 Treas. Reg., §1.318-3, Ex. 2 (1955); Treas. Reg., §1.318·2 (1955). 
42 Some of the problems are discussed in 9 J. TAXATION 266 (1958); Winton and 
Hoffman, "A Case Study of Stock Redemptions under Sections 302 and 318 of the New 
Code," 10 TAX L. REv. 363 (1955). 
43 I.R.C., §318(a)(4)(B). 
44 Treas. Reg., §1.318-4 (1955). 
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ing these rules to a section 302 redemption where the beneficiaries 
of the estate own directly or indirectly any stock in the corporation, 
the danger of dividend instead of sale or exchange treatment 
can immediately be perceived. Although all the stock an estate 
directly owns may be redeemed, the objective standard of com-
plete termination may not be met because of stock constructively 
o-wned by the estate. If the estate constructively owns a large 
number of shares, the other guaranteed standard of "substantially 
disproportionate redemption" will likewise not be met. Of course 
the estate may be able to satisfy the subjective test of "not essen-
tially equivalent to a dividend," but this is particularly difficult 
to prove under section 302 as it is now written. 
The constructive mvnership rules can often be avoided by 
astute planning. When the constructive ownership problem stems 
from the situation where the beneficiary of any legacy in the estate 
directly owns stock which would be attributed to the estate, 
several schemes can be employed. First, the beneficiaries and the 
estate could sell all of their stock at the same time to meet the 
complete termination standard, or sell enough to meet the sub-
stantially disproportionate standard. Second, the estate can be so 
planned that anyone directly or constructively owning stock in 
the corporation would not be a beneficiary of the estate.45 These 
solutions of course are somewhat limited because they would 
be possible only when the non-tax aspects of the arrangement are 
satisfactory to all the parties involved. A more general solution 
would be to delay the redemption of the stock held by the estate 
until distribution of the legacy to the stock-owning beneficiaries 
has taken place. Since under the regulations46 a person is no longer 
a beneficiary of an estate when the legacy to which he is entitled 
has been distributed, the effect of delaying redemption would 
be to avoid the constructive ownership rules. There may be a prac-
tical difficulty, however, when the legacy is in cash because the 
principal source of cash in the estate is often the stock, and there 
would thus be nothing with which to pay the legacy until after 
the redemption. Even if the beneficiary could receive his legacy 
45 Greater use should be made of inter vivos gifts. A revocable trust could accomplish 
the same result as a will and the beneficiary of the trust would not be regarded as ben-
eficiary of the estate. Other possible devices such as this could be used. For purposes of 
section 318 a person with a contingent remainder interest following another's life estate 
is not considered a beneficiary. Treas. Reg., §l.318-2(c) (1955). 
46 Treas. Reg., §l.318-3(a) (1955). See Rev. Rul. 58-111, 1958 INT. REv. BUL. No. 12, 
at 9. 
588 MICHIGAN LAw R.Evmw [Vol. 57 
before the redemption, there is still a danger that the Commis-
sioner at a later time may seek to invoke the "step-transaction" 
doctrine.47 Under this doctrine the two steps could be tied together 
so that the stock of the beneficiary should still be attributed to 
the estate. 
If the problem is that the beneficiary of the estate owns no 
stock himself, but constructively owns the stock of his family 
which is attributed through him to the estate, then section 302(c)(2) 
provides a solution.48 This section provides that if certain con-
ditions are met the constructive ownership rules will not apply 
when there is a complete termination of the directly owned 
interests. These conditions are that the estate shall have no 
further direct interest in the corporation,49 that no part of the 
stock redeemed was acquired under prescribed conditions within 
ten years of the redemption, and that no person owns stock 
attributable to the distributee which was acquired under the 
prescribed conditions within ten years.5° For example, if a son 
and father owned corporation Y and the mother was the beneficiary 
of the father's estate, the constructive ownership rules, without 
section 302(c)(2), would apply. Thus the son's stock would be 
attributed through the mother to the estate, and thereby prevent 
an attempt to meet the objective standard of complete termina-
tion. If the conditions of section 302(c)(2) are met, however, the 
son's stock will not be attributed through the mother to the estate, 
and complete termination would re~ult. 
Several other methods of avoiding the constructive ownership 
rules need to be considered. First, the constructive ownership 
rules do not apply to a section 303 redemption.51 This section 
provides that a corporation can in certain situations redeem stock 
held by an estate to the extent of the estate tax, inheritance tax, 
and administrative costs and such redemption will be treated as 
a sale or exchange. The estate can thus at least partially avoid 
47 American Bantam Car Co., 11 T.C. 397 (1948), affd. per curiam (3d Cir. 1949) 177 
F. (2d) 513, cert. den. 339 U.S. 920 (1950); Mintz, "Step Transactions in Corporate Re-
organizations," 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 247 (1954). 
48 I.R.C., §302(c)(2). 
49 I.R.C., §302(c)(2)(A)(i). 
50 I.R.C., §302(c)(2)(A)(ii). There may be a danger because the estate acquired the 
stock from the decedent within IO years but it is doubtful that these qualifications were 
meant to include acquisition by operation of law. 
51 I.R.C., §303. For a general discussiqn see Lanahan, "Redemptions To Pay Death 
Taxes: Redemptions Through the Use of Related Corporations," 15 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. 
TAX. 493 (1957). 
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dividend consequences on the redemption. Even here there is a 
danger under the regulations52 that the amount paid for the shares 
covering taxes and administrative costs might be treated as a 
dividend. Finally, an attempt to qualify for sale or exchange 
treatment under the subjective test of "not essentially equivalent 
to a dividend" may prove worthwhile. The courts may use the 
subjective test as a convenient means of mitigating the harsh 
results of the constructive ownership rules.63 The Commissioner 
has recently shown a disposition to use this type analysis when 
convinced there is no plan to avoid taxes.64 
2. Redemption Proceeds as Dividends to the Surviving Share-
holders. It is possible that the proceeds paid to redeem stock of a 
deceased shareholder will be taxed as a constructive dividend to 
the surviving shareholders.65 Several recent cases, however, have 
minimized this possibility by indicating that the surviving share-
holder will not be deemed to have received a constructive dividend 
unless he has received "a direct pecuniary benefit." The most 
recent case supporting this view is Holsey v. Commissioner.66 In 
this case the Greenville Auto Sales Co. owned all the outstanding 
shares of the Holsey Co. Joseph R. Holsey secured an option from 
Greenville to purchase 50 percent of the shares and a further op-
tion to purchase, within IO years after the exercise of the first 
option, the other 50 percent. Holsey exercised the first option and 
several years later the second option was revised so that he or a 
corporation in which he owned 50 percent of the common stock 
could purchase the remaining shares. The option was then as-
signed to the Holsey Co. which redeemed the remaining shares. 
The Tax Court felt that the redemption was for the personal hen-
li2 Treas. Reg., §1.303 (1955). For a possible although doubtful danger see Gelband, 
"Tax Trap Hidden in Sec. 303; Careful Timing of Redemptions Necessary," 8 J. TAXA-
TION 244 (1958). 
liS There were no statutory constructive ownership rules under the 1939 code. None-
theless, the courts did use the constructive ownership idea when they found that a 
redemption was essentially equivalent to a dividend because of family ownership of 
stock. Commissioner v. Roberts, (4th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 304. ·Even with the constructive 
ownership idea, they found that certain redemptions were not essentially equivalent to 
a dividend even though there was a family relationship. Ada Murphy McFarlane, 13 
CCH T.C.M. 467 (1954). 
li4 Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 CuM. BUL. 161; Rev. Rul. 56-556, 1956-2 CUM BUL. 177; 
Rev. Rul. 56-584, 1956-2 CUM. BUL. 179. 
lili Generally see Hobbet, "The New Attack on Stock Redemptions," 35 TAXES 830 
(1957); Pavenstedt, "Use of Corporate Funds To Buy Out a Stockholder-The Schmitt 
Case and Its Ramifications," 12 N.Y.U. !Nsr. ON FED. TAX. 203 (1954). 
li6 (3d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 865, revg. 28 T.C. 962 (1957). 
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efit of Holsey since he was in the same position as if he had person-
ally purchased the shares. The argument that the redemption was 
for a corporate purpose because an adjustment in stock owner-
ship was necessary to retain the corporation's automobile dealer 
franchise was rejected by the court on the belief that a realign-
ment of stock ownership is a shareholder purpose. The Third 
Circuit reversed, one judge dissenting, 57 and ruled that "in the 
absence of a direct pecuniary benefit to the taxpayer the Tax 
Court erred in holding the distribution in question taxable to 
him."58 The personal benefit theory of the Tax Court was refuted 
when the court said that even if there was an indirect benefit, it 
had not yet been "realized" within the meaning of the Sixteenth 
Amendment. 59 The court reasoned further that unless there was 
a direct pecuniary benefit, the redemption could not be treated as 
"essentially equivalent to a dividend" to the remaining share-
holder, since there was a change in proportionate interest of the 
shareholders wliich would not have been accomplished by an ordi-
nary dividend. The situation that would involve "a direct pecuni-
ary benefit" to the shareholder would be where he has a contractual 
obligation to purchase the stock of another shareholder, and the 
corporation in redeeming the stock releases this obligation.60 
In the recent case of Zipp v. Commissioner61 the remaining 
shareholders received 46 of the 48 shares of the departing share-
holder and instead of paying for them had the corporation re-
deem the other two shares at a price equal in value to all 48 shares. 
The payment for the two shares was considered a constructive div-
idend to the remaining shareholders. This case was cited in the 
Holsey case as involving a "direct pecuniary benefit" to these 
57 The dissent agreed with the Tax Court view. Holsey v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 
1958) 258 F. (2d) 865 at 869. 
58 Id. at 868-869. 
59 Realized in the sense of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920). Also see Schmitt 
v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1954) 208 F. (2d) 819. For a criticism of the need for realization, 
see Sneed, "A Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale," 43 CoRN. L.Q. 
339 (1958). Cases consistent with this view are Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 13 (1952); Joseph 
P. Schmitt, 20 T.C. 352 (1953), revd. (3d Cir. 1954) 208 F. (2d) 819; Fox v. Harrison, 
(7th Cir. 1944) 145 F. (2d) 521; Earl F. Tucker, 23 T.C. 115 (1954), revd. (8th Cir. 1955) 
226 F. (2d) 177. Cf. Zenz v. Quinlivan, (6th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 914. 
60 Wall v. United States, (4th Cir. 1947) 164 F. (2d) 462 (where the corporation 
assumed the obligation). Eli R. Lowenthal, 6 CCH T.C.M. 678 (1947), affd. (7th Cir. 
1948) 169 F. (2d) 694; Frank P. Holloway, 10 CCH T.C.M. 1257 (1952), affd. per curiam 
(6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 566; Woodworth v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 
719. For a good review of all the cases in this area, see Graham, "Redemption Problems-
The Holsey and Zipp Cases," 36 TAXES 925 (1958). 
6128 T.C. 314 (1957), affd. per curiam (6th Cir. 1958) 259 ,F. (2d) 119. 
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shareholders. Yet neither the Tax Court nor the Sixth Circuit in 
the Zipp case felt that the case involved any direct pecuniary bene-
fit. It was instead felt that the remaining shareholders had caused 
the redeeming corporation's "cash to be distributed for their bene-
fit, i.e., to purchase all" of the departing shareholder's stock.62 
These cases should not endanger the normal stock purchase 
agreement redemption. The test of the Holsey case would be 
met as the surviving shareholders have received no direct pecuni-
ary benefit. Even if they do receive an indirect benefit from the re-
demption, either because of increased control of the corporation 
or because the remaining assets in the corporation are of greater 
value than their proportionate share of the assets before redemp-
tion, such benefit has not yet been realized.63 The Holsey case also 
suggested that there could be no constructive dividend if the 
proportionate interest of the surviving shareholder had changed, 
and this is of course true in all stock purchase agreement 
redemptions. 64 
If the benefit test suggested in the Zipp case is interpreted to 
mean that there will be no constructive dividend to the survivor 
if any corporate purpose is shown, then this test does not endanger 
stock purchase agreement redemptions because of their inherent 
benefit to the corporation.65 In light of a prior Sixth Circuit 
opinion, this would seem to be the proper interpretation of the 
Zipp case.66 The language in the Zipp case might also be in-
terpreted to mean that there will be a constructive dividend to the 
surviving stockholder when the survivor primarily benefits from 
the redemption, even though there is some corporate purpose. If 
this interpretation is accepted, stock purchase agreement redemp-
tions might meet with some difficulties. It can be argued, how-
ever, that these redemptions primarily benefit the corporation 
62 Zipp v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 314 at 329 (1957). 
63 See note 59 supra. 
64 If this test is used in more cases, the government will have a difficult time at• 
tacking stock purchase agreements. However, there is some doubt if it will be applied. 
The test was originally used against shareholders who had their shares redeemed for 
cash and also against shareholders receiving stock dividends. In those areas the question 
was whether the proportionate interest of the shareholders had decreased and not as 
here if they had increased. In those cases the shareholder actually received something 
while here the remaining shareholder has received nothing. It is enough to say that most 
of the cases in this area have not adopted the proportionate interest test but have instead 
used a direct pecuniary benefit test. But see Ferro v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1957) 242 F. 
(2d) 838. 
65 Note 25 supra. 
66 Ferro v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1957) 242 F. (2d) 838. 
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rather than the shareholder. It might also be suggested that the 
case was improperly decided and should not be followed when 
considered in light of cases which hold that a shareholder may dis-
pose of his stock by selling part to the corporation and part to an-
other shareholder without constructive dividend treatment to the 
other shareholder, 67 and cases which hold that a direct pecuniary 
benefit is needed. 68 Another reason for not accepting the rationale 
of the Zipp case is that the holding undermines the usefulness of 
the redemption provision in section 302(b)(3),69 which guarantees 
sale or exchange treatment to shareholders who completely termi-
nate their interest through a redemption. Few shareholders would 
make use of this redemption provision if it would result in a con-
structive dividend to the remaining shareholders. 
The Internal Revenue Service recently indicated that it did 
not intend to extend the constructive dividend reasoning to ordi-
nary stock purchase agreements,70 and it thus seems safe to assume 
that the redemption of a deceased shareholder's stock will not be 
treated as a constructive dividend to the surviving shareholder. 
3. Basis of the Stock Following Redemption. If the redemption 
of the deceased shareholder's stock pursuant to the stock purchase 
agreement does not result in a constructive dividend to the sur-
viving shareholder, it naturally follows that the basis of the sur-
viving shareholder's stock will remain the same as before the re-
demption.71 On the other hand, if the surviving shareholder is 
deemed to have received a constructive dividend when the de-
ceased shareholder's stock was redeemed, he should perhaps re-
ceive a basis for his stock equal to the redemption price of the 
decedent's stock plus the basis of his stock before redemption. The 
reason for this result would be that since he is treated as if he had 
received a dividend and had bought the decedent's shares, he 
should receive the advantage of the "stepped-up" basis. 
The corporation has no basis for the stock even if the redemp-
tion is treated as a sale or exchange and not as a constructive div-
idend to the decedent's estate.72 This result is now dictated by 
67 Ray Edenfield, 19 T.C. 73 (1952); Zenz v. Quinlivan, (6th Cir. 1954) 213 F. (2d) 914. 
68 Note 60 supra. 
69 I.R.C., §302(b)(3). 
10 Comment, 9 J. TAXATION 221 (1958). T.I.R. 109, 58-6 CCH STAND. FED. TAX. REP. 
1(6780 (1958). 
71 I.R.C., §1012 provides for a cost basis. 
72 The corporation should have no basis for the redeemed stock when the surviving 
shareholder received constructive dividend treatment because the distribution then is 
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section 1032(a),73 which provides that a future sale of redeemed 
stock will result in no gain or loss to the corporation.74 Thus it 
would be impossible to argue that the corporation after this re-
demption has any basis for the stock. In addition, good accounting 
principles provide that "any form of shares available for issue 
represents merely a means of raising capital, not actual, realized 
property. "75 
4. Insurance Proceeds Received by the Corporation. The ques-
tion whether the proceeds from a life insurance policy used to 
finance a stock purchase agreement are includible in the corpora-
tion's gross income for income tax purposes is answered by section 
IOI(a)(l).76 That provision states that "gross income does not in-
clude amounts received ... under a life insurance contract, if such 
amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured." This 
would apply to the ordinary stock purchase agreement where the 
corporation was purchaser, beneficiary, and owner of the insur-
ance. 77 The only time that gain must be recognized on receipt of 
insurance proceeds is under section 10l(a)(2),78 when the policy has 
been transferred for a valuable consideration. However, even if an 
insurance policy is transferred to a corporation for valuable con-
sideration, the gain from the proceeds is not subject to the income 
tax under a special exception to the "transfer for value" rule in 
section 10l(a)(2)(B),79 which provides that a transfer "to a corpo-
ration in which the insured is a shareholder or officer" will not 
cause the insurance proceeds to be subject to the income tax. 
The proceeds of the insurance policy may cause an estate tax 
problem. If the decedent is beneficiary or has any of the incidents 
not a sale or exchange but simply a dividend and a subsequent purchase between the 
shareholders. 
73 I.R.C., §1032(a). 
74 This was not always the rule. Before 1954 the basis of redeemed stock was rec-
ognized so that, in certain transactions, gain or loss would be recognized. Reg. 77, Art. 66 
of the 1932 act provided that "if a corporation deals in its own shares as it might in the 
shares of another corporation, the resulting gain or loss is to be computed in the same 
manner as though the corporation were dealing in the shares of another." See Helvering 
v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 45 B.T .A. 472 (1941), revd. (8th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 575, 
cert. den. 319 U.S. 752 (1943). But see Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 
no (1939). 
75 PATON, EssENTIALS OF ACCOUNTING 713 (1949). 
76 I.R.C., §IOI(a)(l). See generally RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND 
EsTATE TAXATION §61.03 (1956). 
77 The section is even broader than this as it is doubtful if the proceeds would be 
includible even if the corporation was not owner of the policy. 
78 I.R.C., §IOI(a)(2). 
79 I.R.C., §IOI(a)(2)(B). 
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of ownership in the policy,80 there is a possibility that both the in-
surance proceeds and the value of the decedent's interest in the 
corporation will be included in the decedent's gross estate.81 A 
proposed regulation provided that in cases where the shareholder 
retains any incidents of ownership, his estate would not include 
both the insurance proceeds and the decedent's interest in the 
corporation if the stock purchase agreement were made in good 
faith. However, if the agreement were made in bad faith, "both the 
value of the decedent's interest or shares (determined without re-
gard to the agreement) and if otherwise includible, the proceeds 
of the insurance ( except to the extent that the proceeds are in-
cluded in the value of the interest or shares)"82 would be included 
in the decedent's gross estate. Although this treatment has been 
omitted from the final regulation, 83 this type of reasoning might be 
used by the government when the decedent instead of the corpo-
ration has the incidents of ownership in the life insurance policies 
used to finance the stock purchase agreement. 
When the estate is beneficiary of the insurance both the pro-
posed and final regulations are silent, si and the government may 
argue for full inclusion of both the stock and the insurance. There 
are cases which hold that only the larger amount will be in-
cluded in the decedent's estate.85 All the above estate tax problems 
concerning the insurance proceeds can be easily avoided by mak-
ing the corporation beneficiary and owner of the policies. 
5. Valuation of Decedent's Stock for Estate Tax Purposes. 
Section 203l(a)86 provides that "The value of the gross estate of 
the decedent shall be determined by including ... the value at the 
time of his death of all property."87 Thus the value of a decedent's 
stock in the corporation will be included in his estate.88 Only the 
so This, of course, would not fall within the category of "conventional" agreements, 
note 5 supra. If the insurance is purchased properly so that the corporation is owner 
and beneficiary of the policy, this problem should not arise. 
81 Insurance is generally included in a decedent's gross estate when the decedent 
retains any incidents of ownership. I.R.C., §2042. 
82 Proposed Treas. Reg., §20.2042-(l)(c)(6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7885 (1956). 
83 Treas. Reg., §20.2042-I(c) (1958). 
84 Treas. Reg., §20.2042-l(b) (1958). 
85 Estate of John T. H. -Mitchell, 37 B.T.A. 1 (1938); M. W. Dobrzensky, 34 B.T .A. 
305 (1936). 
86 I.R.C., §2031(a). 
87 Value means fair market value. Treas. Reg., §20.2031-l(b) (1958). 
88 There is also a problem of inheritance tax which should be analyzed. Other than 
inheritance ta.x, local law can cause some real problems if the agreement is not binding. 
See Matter of Galewitz, 3 App. Div. (2d) 280, 160 N.Y.S. (2d) 564 (1957). 
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question whether the agreement is determinative of the value for 
estate tax purposes89 will here be considered. An estate tax value 
established in this way is desirable in that it avoids the threat of 
the estate being taxed on a 'high valuation while being bound to 
sell at a lower price.00 Equation of the value under the stock 
purchase agreement with the estate tax value also avoids future 
litigation and makes possible a precise calculation of the estate tax 
which will aid business planning. The regulations91 and the courts 
are not clear as to the efficacy of a stock purchase agreement in 
controlling the estate tax valuation, 92 although certain minimum 
requirements may be set down which, if followed, should result 
in the agreement being given binding effect.93 First; the agreement 
must be "a bona fide business arrangement,"94 which is determined 
by the factors of family relationship, full and adequate consider-
ation, and methods of evaluating the corporation. The purpose of 
this requirement is to prevent the parties, by setting a low price 
on the corporation, from effectuating a donative or testamentary 
intent without the payment of a gift or estate tax. When the de-
ceased stockholder's relatives own the remaining shares of stock in 
the corporation, the agreement will be scrutinized closely for this 
testamentary or donative intent.95 Although "a bona fide business 
89 For methods of valuing a small corporation, see Treas. Reg., §20.2031-3, Rev. 
Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 CuM. BUL. 187; Rockefeller, "Valuation of Closely Held Stocks for 
Estate and Gift Tax Purposes," 36 TAXES 259 (1958); LOWNDES AND KRAMER, FEDERAL 
EsrATE AND GIFT TAXES 488-499 (1956). For the binding effect of an agreement on estate 
tax value, see comment, 41 MARQ. L. REv. 48 (1957); Ness, "Federal Estate Tax Con-
sequences of Agreements and Options To Purchase Stock on Death," 49 CoL. L. REv. 
796 (1949); Pavenstedt, "The Second Circuit Reaffirms Efficacy of Restrictive Stock Agree-
ments To Control Estate Tax Valuation," 51 MICH. L. REv. I (1952); Bowe, "Options 
and Valuation of Property for Tax Purposes," 2 VAND. L. REv. 427 (1949). For cases 
involving the binding effect of a stock purchase agreement on gift tax liability, see 
Commissioner v. Mccann, (2d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 385; Raymond J. Moore, 3 T.C. 
1205 (1944). 
90 Of course if there are two truly adverse parties, the agreement price should almost 
equal the market value. In the case of related parties, there may be considerable difference 
between agreement price and market value. 
91 The regulation says that the stock purchase agreement is only one factor in 
determining the estate tax value. Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(h) (1958). 
92 The Supreme Court, in an income tax case, has recognized that such agreement 
could put a ceiling on the valuation of restricted property. Helvering v. Salvage, 297 
U.S. 106 (1936). 
93 A stock purchase agreement should be given effect even if ·below the fair market 
value because value is at best a guess and thus the parties' guess, if made in good faith, 
should govern. Also a restriction on stock may itself diminish its value. 
94 Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(h) (1958). 
95 Edith M. Bense!, 36 B.T .A. 246 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 639; Rev. 
Rul. 54-77, 1954-1 CuM. BUL. 187. 
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arrangement" is difficult to prove when related parties own the 
rest of the corporate stock, it can still be shown if the two objective 
factors of adequate consideration and fair evaluation of the corpo-
ration are clearly shown.96 The type of consideration required by 
the regulations is "money or money's worth."97 Mutual promises, if 
equivalent to "money's worth," may provide the necessary consid-
eration.98 This equivalence is easily shown when the shareholders 
have equal interests and life expectancies, or when the agreement 
is made with a minority shareholder in order to keep him in the 
business. The most important factor in determining if the agree-
ment is "bona fide" is the method of valuing the corporation.99 
The price must fairly reflect the value of the corporation when the 
agreement is executed.100 Thus a disparity between the agreement 
value and market value at the date of death should be insignifi-
cant.101 However, a great disparity may show lack of good faith 
at the date of execution, and for this reason a clause providing for 
periodic re-evaluation should be inserted. This is especially true 
if related parties are involved. A problem considered by the pro-
posed regulations was whether the contemplated insurance pro-
ceeds should be considered in the original valuation, 102 but this 
was solved in the negative by the final regulations.103 Second,104 
there should also be a restriction on the right of the owner to trans-
fer his stock during life.105 To be safe there should be an absolute 
provision against any transfers during life even though a right of 
96 Brodrick v. Gore, (10th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 892; Rose Wasserman, 24 T.C. 1141 
(1955), dismissed ,by stipulation on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 
May v. McGowan, (W.D. N.Y. 1950) 97 F. Supp. 326, affd. (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 396. 
An attempt to show that the agreement was a transfer in contemplation of or to take 
effect on death was rejected. Estate of Lionel Weil, 22 T.C. 1267 (1954) (acq.). 
97 The adequacy of consideration is measured at the date of execution of the 
agreement. 
98 Murphy v. Murphy, 217 Mass. 233, 104 N.E. 466 (1914); Matter of Fieux' Estate, 
241 N.Y. 277, 149 N.'E. 857 (1925); McKinnon v. McKinnon, (8th Cir. 1893) 56 F. 409. 
99 Note 89 supra. 
100 Edith M. Bense!, 36 B.T .A. 246 (1937), affd. (3d Cir. 1938) 100 F. (2d) 139. 
101 Estate of John Q. Strange, P-H T.C.M. 1[42247 (1942). 
102 Proposed Treas. Reg., §20.2042-l(c)(6), 21 Fed. Reg. 7885 (1956). 
. 10s Proposed Treas. Reg., §20.2042-l(c)(6) was dropped in the final regulations. 
Treas. Reg., §20.2042 (1958). See comment, 9 J. TAXATION 302 (1958). 
104 This can be considered a separate qualification or it can be argued that it is 
just another factor to be used to see if the agreement is bona fide. 
105 Estate of James H. Matthews, 3 T.C. 525 (1944) (acq.); Baltimore National Bank 
v. United States, (D.C. Md. 1955) 136 F. Supp. 642; Treas. Reg., §20.2031-2(h) f'Little 
weight will be accorded a price contained in an option or contract under which the 
decedent is free to dispose of the underlying securities at any price he chooses during 
his life time.'1-
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first refusal in the corporation plus a price fixing provision has 
been upheld as a sufficient restriction.106 The reason for this re-
quirement is that if the decedent could dispose of his interest prior 
to death his failure to dispose would be in effect a transfer to the 
corporation and its remaining shareholders of the difference be-
tween the market value before his death and the price set by the 
stock purchase agreement.107 The final requirement108 is that the 
agreement should bind the corporation to buy and the estate to 
sell the interest of the deceased.109 The rationale behind this re-
quirement is that if the estate would be bound not by the price in 
the agreement, then the price should be the fair market value at 
date of death. An agreement has been held binding for valuation 
purposes even when the estate was bound to sell and the corpora-
tion had an option to buy.110 An option on the part of the estate to 
sell is probably not binding, although it might suitably serve as a 
minimum value. An option of first offer completely fails to meet 
the requirement of a binding agreement.111 If the proper precau-
tions are taken at the planning stage, the value set by the stock 
purchase agreement should be determinative of the stock value for 
estate tax purposes. 
C. Operation of the Agteement After the Death 
of One of the Parties 
I. Insurance Policy on the Life of the Survivor. What happens 
to the life insurance policies held on the surviving shareholder is 
not a significant problem in a stock purchase agreement.112 The 
survivor could purchase the insurance on his life from the corpo-
ration. If this were done, the difference between the amount paid 
and the proceeds of the insurance on the survivor's death would 
not be subject to the income tax. Ordinarily a "transfer of value" 
would cause this difference to be taxed under section 10l(a)(2),113 
106 Brodrick v. Gore, (10th Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 892; Estate of Albert L. Salt, 17 
T.C. 92 (1951) (acq.). 
101 This can be analogized to either a transfer with a reservation of a life estate or a 
revocable transfer. I.R.C., §§2036, 2038. 
10s Note I 04 supra. 
109 Rose Newman, 31 B.T.A. 772 (1934): John T. H. Mitchell, 37 B.T .A. l (1938). 
110 Wilson v. Bowers, (S.D. N.Y. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 261, affd. (2d Cir. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 
682; May v. McGowan, (W.D. N.Y. 1950) 97 F. Supp. 326, affd. (2d Cir. 1952) 194 F. (2d) 
396. 
111 Estate of Ambrose Fry, 9 T.C. 503 (1947). 
112 See part II supra. 
118 Generally a transfer for value will be treated the same as an investment in stock 
and thus the appreciation in value would be taxed. I.R.C., §10l(a)(2). 
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but an exception to the ordinary "transfer for value" rule was 
provided in section I0I(a)(2)(B) when the transfer for value is to 
the insured.114 On the other hand, the insurance can be retained 
by the corporation as "key man" insurance, 115 or to finance another 
stock purchase agreement, and the _proceeds from the insurance 
will not be subject to any income tax.116 
II. CROSS PURCHASE AGREEMENTS COMPARED WITH STOCK 
REDEMPTION AGREEMENTS 
If a cross purchase agreement, where the surviving shareholder 
is to buy up the deceased shareholder's interest, is used instead of 
a stock purchase agreement, greater tax safety can often be ob-
tained.117 Some of the non-tax disadvantages of a cross purchase 
agreement should be noted, however, before the tax aspects are 
discussed.U8 First, if there are more than two shareholders in-
volved, a cross purchase agreement is cumbersome.119 Each share-
holder must purchase insurance on the lives of each of the other 
shareholders.120 There will be confusion when one of the parties 
to the agreement dies, because in order to continue the agreement 
all of the policies owned by the deceased on the surviving share-
holders will have to be purchased by the survivors.121 This prob-
lem might be solved by originally putting all the insurance in 
trust and having the agreement administered by a trustee. These 
problems do not arise in a stock purchase agreement, which is ad-
ministered through the corporation. Secondly, there is the risk 
114 I.R.C., §I0I(a)(2)(B). 
115 Clapp, "Deduction of Premiums and Interest Paid To Carry Insurance; Taxation 
of Annuities; Keyman Insurance," 9 N.Y.U. INST. oN FED. TAX. 21 at 35 (1951). 
116 I.R.C., §IOl(a)(I). 
117 A cross purchase agreement is where the shareholder instead of the corporation 
agrees to buy the decedent's stock. If insurance is used, each shareholder should purchase 
insurance on the life of the other. If this is not done, serious tax consequences can result. 
118 Generally see Krogue, "Funding Stock Purchase Plan with Life Insurance," 
ESTATE PLANNERS Q. 34 (March 1958); Redeker, "Business Insurance Agreements-Entity 
Purchase versus Cross Purchase,'' 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 675 (1954). 
119 The same thing is true if it is contemplated that additional shareholders will 
join the agreement at a later time. 
120 This could result in 30 policies when 6 shareholders are involved as each share-
holder owns the insurance on every other shareholder's life. 
121 The agreement could be continued without the purchase of these policies from 
the decedent's estate ,by the purchase of new policies or cash financing but new policies 
may be unavailable because one of the survivors is uninsurable and the parties generally 
will not have enough free cash. Ordinarily additional funding is needed to cover the 
additional interest that each shareholder purchased from the decedent. 
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that an individual shareholder may fail to make the premium pay-
ment. Although this risk is present in the case of a corporation, 
there is less chance of its occurrence when the corporation is re-
sponsible for the premiums.122 Despite these disadvantages, a cross 
purchase agreement may from a non-tax viewpoint be preferable to 
a stock purchase agreement because of certain stringent restric-
tions placed on corporations by local law.123 
If the shareholders are satisfied with the non-tax aspects of a 
cross purchase agreement, the tax features should make the cross 
purchase agreement even more desirable. It has been argued that 
since the shareholders pay the insurance premiums in a cross 
purchase agreement, the corporation would have to pay a large 
enough dividend so that the amount remaining in the hands of 
the shareholders after taxes would cover the premium payments. 
What this argument overlooks is that the distribution for the pre-
mium payments may not be considered a dividend when the stock-
holders are also employees, but rather additional compensation 
and therefore deductible by the corporation.124 If this is true, the 
value of the deduction to the corporation may more than offset 
the added tax to the shareholder, 125 and thus the cross purchase 
form could actually save taxes on the premium payments.126 
122 The reason for this is that both shareholders are continually in touch with the 
corporate affairs and they can be sure that the premiums are paid and that the corporation 
is financially able to redeem. It is also argued by some that there is a psychological 
difference when a corporation handles the agreement. Redeker, "Business Insurance 
Agreements-Entity Purchase versus Cross Purchase," 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. 675 
(1954). 
12s For problems of local law, see note 8 supra. There is an additional non-tax factor 
of inequity on premium payments. It can arise in a cross purchase agreement when both 
shareholders own the corporation equally but the younger shareholder must pay the 
greater premium. It can be argued that this is not inequitable ,because it is likely that 
he will have less payments to make before the older shareholder dies. Another inequity 
in the cross purchase is when the minority shareholder has to pay a large premium to 
cover the majority shareholder's interest but this can be refuted as the minority share-
holder gets greater value when he ,buys out the majority. The argument of inequity in 
a stock purchase agreement is when there is a difference in interests and the majority 
shareholder will be bearing the larger part of the premium payment so the minority 
shareholder can buy him out. Davis, "Business Purchase Agreements," 94 TRUSTS AND 
EsrATES 284 (1955). 
124 I.R.C., §162. See Casper Ranger Construction Co., I B.T.A. 942 (1925). 
125 BOWE, EsrATE PLANNING AND TAXATION, Stud. ed., §16.22 (1957). 
126 The savings for each case would have to be calculated but it can be generally 
stated that if the shareholder's marginal rate is less than the corporation's rate, there 
will be some tax savings. If the distribution is treated as a dividend, there would be no 
savings and the stock purchase agreement might be cheaper. On the other hand a stock 
purchase agreement always presents the danger that the premium payment will be 
treated as a constructive dividend. See part I-A-1 supra. 
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A cross purchase agreement is highly advantageous because 
there are no problems involving the accumulated earnings tax 
of section 531,127 the constructive ownership rule of section 
318,128 or a constructive dividend to the surviving shareholder 
at the time of the "buy-out."129 These problems do not arise be-
cause the corporation is in no way connected with the agreement. 
When the basis of the survivor's stock in the cross purchase 
method is compared with the basis of the survivor's stock in the 
stock purchase method, the most important advantage of the cross 
purchase method is revealed. The basis of the survivor's stock, if 
a cross purchase agreement is used, is equal to the cost of his 
original stock plus the cost of the stock purchased from the de-
cedent.130 Under the stock purchase agreement the basis of the 
survivor's stock is only the cost of his original stock. His basis is 
not increased by the value of the decedent's stock,131 because the 
corporation rather than the survivor purchased the decedent's 
stock.132 
Estate and income tax problems in relation to the insurance 
proceeds on death of one of the parties are the same in both agree-
ments. The discussion in the stock redemption area on this subject 
is fully applicable to a cross purchase agreement.133 The final com-
parison between the two agreements deals with what hap.pens to 
127 I.R.C., §531. See part I-A-3 supra. 
128 I.R.C., §318. See part I-B-1 supra. 
120 See part I-B-2 supra. 
130 I.R.C., §1012. 
131 See part I-B-3 supra. 
1s2 It -can be argued that the basis difference is justified because of the difference in 
value of the corporations. Thus in a cross purchase agreement the survivor receives an 
increased basis because the value of the corporation remains the same while his interest 
increases. In a stock purchase agreement, the survivor's basis remains the same even 
though his interest increases because the value of the corporation has decreased. The 
fallacy in this reasoning is that during the life of cross purchase agreements part of the 
assets were paid out of the corporation to finance the agreement (at least enough to 
cover insurance premiums) while in a stock purchase agreement no assets are removed 
from the corporation. As a result of this, at the death of one of the parties the value of 
the corporation should be about the same under either agreement. Thus, the difference 
in basis is unjustified. Another possible argument to justify the basis difference is that 
the funds used by the survivor to purchase the decedent's stock in a cross purchase agree-
ment were distributed from the corporation but were taxed to the survivor, and thus his 
basis should be increased. The funds used by the corporation to purchase the decedent's 
stock in a stock purchase agreement were distributed by the corporation but were never 
taxed to the survivor and thus his basis should remain the same. The fallacy here is 
that the survivor in the cross purchase agreement may have been receiving the payments 
as additional compensation and thus only paying one tax (individual) while the survivor 
under the stock purchase agreement was also paying one tax (corporation). 
133 I.R.C., §IOl(a). See part I-B-4 supra. 
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the insurance on the life of the survivors after the death of one of 
the parties. The insurance on the life of the survivors in a stock 
purchase agreement is owned by the corporation and, as was 
shown above, 134 no tax problems are presented. In a cross purchase 
agreement the insurance on the life of the survivors is in the 
decedent's estate,135 which can cause a serious problem. The 
problem stems from the odd drafting in section 10l(a)(2)(B),136 
and can best be shown by first analyzing section 10l(a)(2).137 This 
provision states that when life insurance is transferred for value, 
the proceeds on the death of the insured in excess of the cost will 
be subject to the income tax in the hands of the transferee.138 Sec-
tion 10l(a)(2)(B) provides an exception to 10l(a)(2) when the 
transfer for value is "to the insured, to a partner of the insured, 
to a partnership in which the insured is a partner, or to a corpo-
ration in which the insured is a shareholder or officer." However, 
for some unknown reason the provision fails to provide an ex-
ception for a transfer for value to fellow shareholders of the in-
sured.139 Thus, if the survivors in a cross purchase agreement 
wished to continue the agreement by purchasing the insurance on 
the life of the other survivors from the decedent's estate,140 they 
would eventually be subject under section IOI(a)(2) to an income 
tax liability on the proceeds of the insurance. 0 f course if there 
were only one survivor who purchased the insurance on his own 
life from the decedent's estate, there would be no income tax 
liability on the proceeds under section 10l(a)(2) because section 
IOl(a)(2)(B) clearly excepts transfers for value to the insured. 
In the case of corporations with only two shareholders, the 
cross purchase agreement would be both the safer and cheaper 
form of "buy and sell" agreement. Since there is no problem of 
constructive ownership in the cross purchase arrangement,141 it 
would also be the safer form for related parties. 
134 See part I·C supra. 
185 Since in a cross purchase agreement the decedent owned insurance on the life 
of the other shareholders, his estate would have to include the value of these insurance 
policies. I.R.C., §203l(a). 
186 I.R.C., §10l(a)(2)(B). 
187 I.R.C., §10l(a)(2). 
188 See note 113 supra. 
139 The American Bar Association has requested that this provision be modified. 
H. Hearing before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 8381 (Technical Amendments 
Act of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 2832 (1958). 
140 Note 121 supra. 
141 Constructive ownership applies when a corporation is redeeming and not when 
shareholders are purchasing. See part I-B-1 supra. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
A general consideration of what the law should be may con-
tribute to a fuller understanding of the problems involved when 
dealing with a stock purchase agreement. The basic problem in 
these agreements stems from the imposition of a corporate tax 
which in the case of a closely-held corporation is highly artificial. 
As a result of this distinction between corporation and individual, 
taxpayers are constantly attempting to avoid the tax on one en-
tity or the other without regard for the business or personal nature 
of the transaction. 
Congress has quite properly acted to prevent avoidance 
schemes.142 Section 531143 was designed to prevent a corporation 
from accumulating earnings without a corporate purpose in order 
to avoid an ordinary income tax on its shareholders and then, at 
some future time, have the shareholders either liquidate or sell 
their interests in the corporation at capital gains benefits. When 
this section is invoked by the government against a stock purchase 
agreement, there is a conflict of policies. On the one hand the 
agreement accomplishes just what the statute attempts to prevent 
and should perhaps be subject to the penalty tax. However, it can 
be argued that the underlying policy behind the use of stock 
purchase agreements in general, to preserve small businesses, 144 
outweighs the policy of section 531. Further congressional action 
can be found in section 318 which has the effect of making a 
redemption involving related parties tax.able as a dividend because 
of the avoidance possibilities. This provision is undoubtedly too 
inclusive and should be modified.145 
142 There are several statutory provisions which modify the strict separate entity 
treatment, such as I.R.C., §§267(b)(2), 341, 541, 1371. 
143 I.R.C., §531. 
144 The recent hearings on the Technical Amendments Act showed innumerable 
instances where men had either merged their corporations or were thinking of merging 
them because of the serious tax consequences on death. H. Hearings before Committee 
on Ways and Means on H.R. 8381 (Technical Amendments Act of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d 
sess. (1958). Also see Brown, "How the Premium Payment Test Affects Small Business," 
36 TAXES 295 (1958). The importance of this merger argument has been somewhat min-
imized by I.R.C., §6166 which allows the estate tax of "small business estates" to be paid 
over a IO-year period. The agreement also aids small business by the benefits provided 
during the existence of the Agreement. Note 25 supra. 
145 The recent hearings on the Technical Amendments Act uncovered a great deal 
of dissatisfaction with this provision. H. Hearings on H.R. 8381 (Technical Amendments 
Act of 1958), 85th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 2920, 2980, 3176 (1958). Also see comment, 9 J. 
TAXATION 266 (1958). See Ringel, Surrey and Warren, "Attribution of Stock Ownership 
in the Internal Revenue Code," 72 HARv. L. REv. 209 (1958). 
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The government has, through litigation, also attempted to 
prevent tax avoidance schemes. These attempts have come in a 
series of cases involving constructive dividends where taxpayers 
have used the corporate entity in an effort to minimize taxes. In 
Holsey v. Commissioner,146 the taxpayer wished to purchase the 
shares of the remaining shareholder and, having insufficient funds 
or perhaps not wishing to spend after-tax dollars, 147 he had the 
corporation purchase the shares. No constructive dividend was 
found. In Zipp v. Commissioner,148 a similar situation was pre-
sented except that neither the taxpayer nor the corporation had 
adequate funds to purchase the remaining shares. The corporation 
used borrowed funds which could be paid back with before-tax 
dollars, and redeemed the shares. A constructive dividend to the 
remaining shareholders was held to have been received. In Prunier 
v. Commissioner,149 the principal shareholder was the owner 
and beneficiary of an insurance policy used to fund a stock pur-
chase agreement, while the corporation paid the premiums. It 
was held that the payments did not constitute constructive divi-
dends. It must be admitted that the factual situations here dis-
cussed, although related to the constructive dividend problems pre-
sented in the ordinary stock purchase agreement, represent ex-
treme avoidance situations. It is doubtful if the government would 
extend its attack to a properly drawn stock purchase agreement.11,o 
Even if the government seeks to extend its theory to cases involv-
ing a properly drawn stock purchase agreement, the theory 
should be disputed. The government's argument is generally that 
the individual shareholder benefits from the transaction and 
should be taxed on the benefit received.151 The difficulty with this 
rationale is that anything which benefits the corporation will 
146 28 T.C. 962 (1957), revd. (3d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 865. 
147 This has reference to income which was taxed to the corporation and distributed 
to the shareholders where it was again taxed. If the corporation does the purchasing, tht> 
income would only be taxed at the corporate level. 
14828 T.C. 314 (1957), affd. per curiam (6th Cir. 1958) 259 F. (2d) 119. 
149 28 T.C. 19 (1957), revd. (1st Cir. 1957) 248 F. (2d) 818. 
150 See part I-A-1, I-B-2 supra. See note 147 supra. However, it must 1be recognized 
that in a father-son corporation the benefits of a stock purchase agreement are not so 
clear. The son would receive the corporation's stock through his father's estate even 
without an agreement and thus the continuity of ownership argument for a stock purchase 
agreement is quite weak. 
151 See Henry E. Prunier, 28 T.C. 19 (1957); Sanders v. Fox, (D.C. Utah 1957) 149 
F. Supp. 942; Joseph R. Holsey, 28 T.C. 962 (1957). See -the discussion of the government's 
brief in Lawthers, "Prunier Reversed: No Income to Stockholders from Premiums Paid 
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at least in some degree benefit its shareholders, 152 especially in 
a closed corporation. The use of this benefit theory places the 
separate entity distinction in a confusing and indefinite position 
which has caused a great deal of dissatisfaction.153 
The proper theory which should be applied to the separate en-
tity problem has been suggested by a number of recent cases.154 
Since Congress has recognized separate entities, with modifications, 
the government and the courts should do likewise. The only de-
viation from this full recognition should be when the transaction 
itself has absolutely no business purpose.155 Should avoidance in-
crease, the problem would be squarely presented to Congress 
either to modify or repeal the separate entity treatment.156 If 
avoidance does not increase, it is hoped that the law will begin to 
take a more definite and reassuring shape, which will lend itself to 
proper business planning. 
Joel D. Tauber, S.Ed. 
by Corporation," 8 J. TAXATION 12 (1958); Lawthers, "IRS Continuing Attack on Insured 
Redemptions Despite Court Setbacks; Sanders Reversed," 8 J. TAXATION 322 (1958). 
152 For a discussion of the different "purposes" of a shareholder, see Sneed, "A 
Defense of the Tax Court's Result in Prunier and Casale," 43 CoRN. L. Q. 339 (1958). 
158 Rabkin, "The Close Corporation-Through the Looking Glass," 8 N.Y.U. INsr. 
oN FED. TAX. 664 (1950); Jones and Gleason, "Casale Reversed: Corporate Insurance Not 
Dividend to Controlling Stockholder," 7 J. TAXATION 258 (1957); comment, 71 HARV. 
L. REv. 687 (1958). 
154 See Sanders v. Fox, (10th Cir. 1958) 253 F. (2d) 855; Casale v. Commissioner, 
(2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 440; Holsey v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 865. 
155 This test does not concern the benefit to the shareholder but only the benefit 
to the corporation. For this test the substance and not the form of the transaction should 
be closely scrutinized. An excellent example of this is a case where a shareholder was 
owner and beneficiary of a policy and the only connection the corporation had with the 
policy was that it paid the premium; the court still felt there was no constructive 
dividend. Lewis v. O'Malley, (8th Cir. 1944) 140 F. (2d) 735. If substance is to prevail, 
whether or not the insurance is mentioned in the agreement should be unimportant. 
Some courts have attempted to make this distinction. Sanders v. Fox, (10th Cir. 1958) 
253 F. (2d) 855, held that since the insurance was to :be used to purchase the stock as 
required in the agreement, the premium payments were not constructive dividends to 
the shareholder, On the other hand, Casale v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 
440, stated that since the insurance was separate from the agreement, it would be subject 
to corporate creditors and therefore the premiums were not constructive dividends to the 
shareholders. This "no corporate benefit" test would not apply when a constructive 
dividend is invoked against a surviving shareholder. In this type of case there should 
be no dividend treatment unless there is a direct pecuniary benefit even though there 
is no corporate purpose. The reason for this liberal view is that a tax. against the surviving 
shareholder undermines the realization doctrine and deprives §302(b)(2) of its effectiveness. 
15G To the extent that new sub-chapter S, of the Internal Revenue Code, which 
permits electing "small business corporations" to avoid the corporate tax, is applicable, 
Congress has made some strides in this direction. 
